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THE RELATION OF RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY LIFE 
TO RATIONALITY IN AUGUSTINE 
William J. Collinge 
This paper argues that in Augustine rationality in religion depends in important respects 
on religious social practice. This point is developed in reference to the questions of the 
reasonableness of a commitment to a particular religion, the meaningfulness of religious 
terms and concepts, and the truth and falsity of religious claims. In a concluding section, 
I contend that Augustine, while giving rationality in religion a basis in religious practice. 
succeeds in avoiding the tendency, found in some otherwise similar contemporary posi-
tions. to sever rationality in religion from rationality in other domains of inquiry. 
I 
Richard Bernstein's recent book, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, 
Hermeneutics, and Praxis,! describes and advances what its author refers to as 
a "conversation" about rationality. A "conversation," in Bernstein's terms, is 
"an extended and open dialogue which presupposes a background of intersubjec-
tive agreements and a tacit sense of relevance. "2 The present conversation about 
rationality is a dialogue, or rather an intersecting set of dialogues and debates, 
about meaning and truth. In Bernstein's view, this conversation is moving toward 
"a more historically situated, nonalgorithmic, flexible understanding of human 
rationality" than was characteristic of an earlier emphasis on "Method," with 
"fixed rational criteria. "3 One important featu"re of the conversation is an increas-
ing, though scarcely unanimous, tendency to see meaning and truth as rooted 
in, and unintelligible apart from social practice. 
Bernstein's points of reference are debates about rationality which are current 
in the philosophy of the natural and social sciences, hermeneutics, and political 
theory. Though Bernstein has little to say about theology, there have been trends 
in that field, largely independent of the trends he discusses, which have also led 
to a renewed emphasis on the grounding of discourse in practice. One such trend 
is the movement to reintegrate systematic and doctrinal theology with liturgy 
and spirituality, as represented in the recovery of the patristic4 and monasticS 
ideals of theology among European Catholic theologians in the middle of this 
century. Another is the liberation theology of the third world, which arises out 
of the practice of Christian communities and looks for verification to the liberating 
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practice of the Christian Church, its "active, effective participation in the struggle 
which the exploited social classes have undertaken against their oppressors."6 
The present paper is an effort to bring one of the greatest patristic and monastic 
theologians, Augustine, into relation with the contemporary conversation. To 
view Augustine from within the context of this conversation illuminates Augus-
tine's thought, particularly on the relationship of "faith and reason." In Augustine, 
one finds elements of a view of rationality in religion in which meaning and 
truth are grounded in the social life of the religious community. These elements 
exist in Augustine's thought alongside a non-historical Platonic ideal of ration-
ality, which in Bernstein's terms would be a form of "objectivism," that is, "the 
basic conviction that there is or must be some permanent, ahistorical matrix or 
framework to which we can ultimately appeal in determining the nature of 
rationality, knowledge, truth, reality, goodness, or rightness. "7 Augustine cer-
tainly had such a conviction: the ultimate standard was the timeless Word of 
God which illuminates our minds-yet the more historical ideal I am about to 
sketch corresponds to Augustine's conviction that that timeless.Word was also 
incarnate in history; thus, in Augustine's eyes, these two ideals are not contradic-
tory. (It is worth remembering that even in Plato's Platonism rational discourse 
proceeds through the shared search for insight on the part of concrete, historical 
dialogue participants, not through the application of a timeless, inflexible 
Method.) 
In the treatment of Augustine which occupies the main body of this paper, I 
will consider, first, the role of practice in warranting the rationality of an initial 
faith commitment, then the role of religious community life in grounding the 
meaningfulness of religious terms and propositions, and finally the role of 
religious community life in warranting the truth claims made by the religion in 
question. Among religions, my scope is restricted to Catholic Christianity and 
Manichaeism, as these are the only religions to which Augustine gives serious 
consideration. Augustine thus presented has, I contend, something to contribute 
to the present conversation, particularly as the latter treats of rationality in 
religion. In some contemporary thinkers who relate religious rationality to social 
practice, there is a corresponding tendency to isolate religion from the rest of 
rational discourse. This paper will conclude by contrasting Augustine's approach 
to one such presentation of rationality in religion. 
II 
As, in the case of science, we can distinguish between the rationality of theory 
choice and of argumentation within the confines of a theory, so in religion we 
can distinguish the rationality of making an initial faith commitment from that 
of seeking understanding within such a commitment. For Augustine, communal 
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life plays a role in both, and these roles are related, though distinct. 
Those who are in a position to deliberate whether to become Catholic Christians 
are addressed in Augustine's apologetic arguments, which appear in their fullest 
form (outside the City of God) in two treatises from 390-1, De vera religione 
(DVR) and De utilirate credendi (DUC).8 In these arguments, I would like to 
focus on three related themes, namely situatedness, trust, and authority. 
Situatedness. Unlike the rational apologetics of later centuries, which sought 
to demonstrate first that God exists, then that he revealed himself in Jesus (as 
proven by the resurrection), then that he founded a church,9 Augustine's argu-
ments presuppose a certain situatedness on the part of their audience, a context 
of shared beliefs and values that do not have to be established by argument. The 
main figures studied by Bernstein tend to hold that this is true of all rational 
arguments, though they would stipulate that these beliefs and values are not 
immune to possible challenge in another context. A statement such as the fol-
lowing from De vera religione, which could seem cavalier on a first reading, 
could also be seen as legitimately indicating the situatedness of the argument: 
"Those who think it a vain or even a wicked thing to despise the world of sense 
and to subject the soul to God most high that he may purge it with virtue must 
be refuted with a different argument; if indeed they are worth disputing with" 
(DVR 4.6). 
Trust. Primary among factors which situate an individual inquirer is a 
framework of belief based on trust. In DUC, Augustine argues that "nothing 
would remain stable in human society" if we did not believe some things simply 
on the basis of trust in others; as an illustration, he cites "dutifulness, the most 
sacred bond of the human race," which relies on trust that one's parents are 
one's parents (DUC 12.26). Friendship, likewise; is impossible without belief 
based in trust (DUC 10.23-11.24), and so also is education, which cannot begin 
without a mutual trust between teacher and student (DUC 10.23, 12.27-13.28, 
cf. 6.13). The later treatise, De fide rerum invisibilium (DFRI)lO develops this 
line of argument further, in particular to include all beliefs about the past (1.1-2.4). 
Authority. Thus the prospective religious believer is faced with the choice of 
whom to trust. "We have got to consider whom we have to believe" (DVR 
24.45). This is a question of authority: "Authority--auctoritas-for the Roman 
is a non-coercive force, founded upon tradition and social position, ... an 
essentially moral influence .... "11 Lacking "wisdom," one must judge as best 
one can which teacher has wisdom and can lead one to it (DUC 12.27-13.28), 
and the need for authority in religion is heightened when, as in DVR, the question 
becomes that of what is God's "temporal dispensation" for leading the soul 
wisdom. 
Augustine's often-misunderstood epigram, "I would not believe the gospel 
except as moved by the authority of the Catholic Church"12 uses "authority" in 
RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY AND RATIONALITY 245 
the sense discussed above, more or less equivalent to "stature" in regard to 
credibility or trustworthiness. This claim to authority is backed up in numerous 
ways, notably by reference to the general acceptance of Christianity (DUC 7.15, 
14.31), miracles (DUC 16.34), the antiquity and continuity of the Church, as 
shown in the succession of bishops from apostolic times (CEM 4.5), and not 
least by the lives of Christians. Christianity'S power to transform the human race 
morally is the final consideration brought forward in DUC to support the authority 
of the Church. There the emphasis is primarily on the ascetic actions of Christians 
(abstinence, fasts, celibacy, etc.). The two-part treatise, De moribus ecclesiae 
catholicae et de moribus Manichaeorum (DME and DMM, A.D. 388),13 which 
likewise extols Christians' asceticism, goes further in stressing the fact that the 
Christians' asceticism, unlike that of the Manichaeans, is based on love of God 
and neighbor (DME 33.71,73, in contrast to DMM 14.31-35). The first part of 
DME is concerned to show that what reason tells us about the good for human 
beings is that it consists in love of God and neighbor, and the second part argues 
for the authority of the Catholic Church as the teacher of this love (especially 
in ch. 30), in that it provides a communal atmosphere in which people are trained 
in its exercise (chs. 30-33). Acknowledging that not every Christian abides 
perfectly in this love, (ch. 34), Augustine singles out specific communities which 
are distinguished in the practice of love, as in the following excerpts from a 
description of monastic communities in Milan and Rome: 
In these communities, no one is urged to undertake austerities beyond 
his tolerance, and nothing is imposed upon an individual against his 
will. Nor is he looked down upon by the others because he confesses 
himself unable to imitate them . . . . All of their efforts are . . . di-
rected, not to rejecting certain kinds of food as corrupt, but to overcoming 
concupiscence and preserving brotherly love.... Charity is 
safeguarded above all. It rules their eating, their speech, their dress, 
their countenance. It is charity that brings them together and unites 
them. To violate charity is considered an offense against God. Anything 
that opposes charity is immediately attacked and cast out; it is not 
permitted to continue a single day. They know that charity is so esteemed 
by Christ and the apostles that if it be lacking, everything is done in 
vain, but if it be present all is fulfilled (DME 33.71.73). 
Such examples enhance the auctoritas, the trustworthiness of the Catholic 
Church for Augustine's prospective readers in the same manner as testimony to 
an individual's good character increases his or her credibility as a witness. They 
also induce the reader to share to some extent in the love which binds the 
community together. Moreover, if a religious community's ideals are in keeping 
with those of the most respected philosophy, and if it can succeed where others 
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have failed in getting people actually to live by those ideals, as both DME and 
DVR argue, then the case for at least trying this religion first is very strong 
indeed. Again, the "situatedness" of the argument is clear-Augustine could 
reasonably assume his audience would value the ideals of asceticism and com-
munal love, as even now we can reasonably assume a Western audience will 
value the second. 14 More generally, any use of moral considerations in religious 
apologetic must either promote the religion in question on the basis of moral 
values already acknowledged by the argument's audience or challenge the audi-
ence's values on the basis of some ground the audience can be led to accept. In 
either case, it is difficult to think of a stronger basis of support than the example 
of the community life which the religion engenders. 
The epistemic role of authority in religion differs from that in the other areas 
mentioned in DUC and DFRI, such as history and much of education, and this 
difference points to another way in which religious community life can figure 
in apologetics. Augustine writes in De diversis quaestionibus 83, question 48 
(conjectured by the English translator as having been written in 391): 
Three classes of things are objects of belief. First, there are those things 
which always are believed and never understood, e.g., history, which 
deals with events both temporal and human. Second, there are those 
things which are understood as soon as they are believed, e.g., all 
human reasonings either in mathematics or in any of the sciences. Third, 
there are those things which are first believed and afterwards understood. 
Of such a character is that which cannot be understood of divine things 
except by those who are pure in heart. This understanding is achieved 
through observing those commandments which concern virtuous living. 15 
If one can see, in the life of the Church, the "observation of those commandments 
which concern virtuous living," then one might hope, by embracing this way of 
life, to come to understand what one initially could only believe on the authority 
of others. In this way, a portrait of Christian community life, such as that given 
in DME, could hold out a prospect of experiential validation of the meaning and 
truth of Christian teaching. 16 
III 
As Augustine says in DME and elsewhere, following Matthew 22:40, the 
commandments reduce ultimately to the commandments of the love of God and 
neighbor, and those two in tum are really one (De Trinitate [DT] 8.8.12) Y 
Living in love of God and neighbor in the Christian community, can one come 
to understand what that community believes? Augustine comes to identify the 
gift of the Holy Spirit as the love which binds the community together, from 
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which it follows that the experience of this love is an experience of God. 
Let none say: "I do not know what I am to love." Let him love his 
brother, and he will love that same love: he knows the love whereby 
he loves better than the brother whom he loves. God can be more known 
to him than his brother-really more known, because more present; 
more known because ~ore inward; more known, because more sure. 
Embrace the love that is God: through love embrace God. He is the 
very love that links together in holy bond all good angels and all God's 
servants, and unites them and us to one another and in obedience to 
himself (DT 8.8.12). 
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We can know that what we call "love" of self or others is genuine love if it is 
caused by or aimed toward our or their "righteousness" (iustitia) (DT 8.6.9-
8.7.10), which in tum is identified by reference to a "pattern" which we possess 
inwardly, which in Augustine's Platonic metaphysicsl8 is itself a participation 
by our minds in the Word of God (DT 8.6.9). Scriptural and philosophical 
considerations here combine to warrant something like a mysticism of the com-
munity, whereby our will is united with the third person of the Trinity and our 
intellect with the second. 
How can this experience lead to understanding? The idea of mysticism provides 
a clue-a mystical experience leads to understanding only through being articu-
lated in language and in concrete practice. David Burrell writes of the Confessions: 
It is as though Augustine realizes that mere insight must be filled out 
by expression before we can possess what we have seen. And since 
experience demands language and language brings with it a structure 
of consequences, those entailments must reach into the organization of 
one's life before he can be said to understand in a way that gives him 
facility with a new language. 19 
The practices of the Christian community, the community made one through the 
gift of love in the Holy Spirit, would be the way that unity is articulated visibly 
and historically. Augustine singles out the sacraments in this regard, noting, 
"There can be no religious society, whether the religion be true or false, without 
some sacrament or visible symbol to serve as a bond of union. "20 So if the bond 
of unity in the Christian community is the gift of love in the Holy Spirit, then 
by shaping one's life according to the practices of that community, especially 
its sacramental practices, one would be enabled to grow in understanding of 
what that love means in the concrete. This is analogous to the way in which 
friends, through their interactions, learn to understand one another and to under-
stand friendship. 
As one's friend's state of mind cannot be directly seen but must be understood 
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on the basis of his or her outward actions (DFRI 1.2), so the outward practice 
of the Church, as the community bound by the Holy Spirit, becomes in Augus-
tine's later writings a source for "reading off' what God is in relation to his 
people. In this respect, the practice of the Church would playa role somewhat 
like that of Scripture. Augustine in fact speaks of the collective life of the Church 
as like God's body: 
Let us purge the eye by which God can be seen . . . . There is something 
you may imagine, if you would see God; "God is love." What sort of 
face has love? What form has it? What stature? What feet? What hands 
has it? No man can say. And yet it has feet, for these carry men to 
church; it has hands, for these reach forth to the poor; it has eyes, for 
thereby we consider the needy ... 21 
Thus the collective sacramental and ethical practice of the Church would ground 
its collective understanding, as expressed verbally in doctrine and prayer, of 
what "love" means. 
IV 
Does anything like this apply to individuals within the Church? Augustine's 
later writings are in general less concerned with individuals' quests for under-
standing than are his earlier works, but De Trinitate is an exception. Apart from 
the passage quoted above on fraternal love, DT contains little direct reference 
to Christian social life, but the latter lies in the background of the argument of 
Books 8-15 to some extent. Those books aim to provide some imperfect analogy 
of the divine Trinity in the structure of human consciousness. The experience 
of love, as described in Book 8, is meant to provide a starting point, but Augustine 
eventually arrives at the mental triad of memory, understanding (intelligentia), 
and wiIl or love as the most promising of the various analogies of the Trinity 
he explores. 
It should not be overlooked that these books are works of spirituality as well 
as of systematic theology. To arrive at the kind of understanding of the Trinity 
which is sought in them requires not simply an effort of intellect but a conversion 
that reshapes one's manner of living. 22 The theological principle which governs 
the succession of analogies is that human minds are an image of God. This 
image is most perfectly realized when we remember, understand and love God 
(DT 14.12.15). To the extent that we fail to do so, the image of God is de-formed 
in us (DT 14.16.22). Thus, to reflect the Trinity most fully, our inner life must 
be re-formed, and this is a matter of "daily advances whereby the image is made 
anew": 
He who is thus renewed by daily advancing in the knowledge of God, 
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in righteousness and holiness of truth, is changing the direction of his 
love from the temporal to the eternal, from the visible to the intelligible, 
from the carnal to the spiritual; diligently endeavouring to curb and 
abate all lust for the one, and to bind himself in charity to the other 
(DT 14.17.23). 
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Thus to understand the Trinity by means of the analogy of our inner life, we 
must become more fully in the image of the Trinity; a moral and religious 
transformation is required for the success of intellectual effort, and DT aims to 
promote both. It is not accidental that the tone of DT becomes more homiletic 
and scriptural as the argument moves from Book 9 to Book 14. 
Augustine notes in Book 15 that a reader might be able to follow the progression 
of his argument yet regard it as no more than a hypothetical construction. But 
what matters is to be able to experience one's own subjectivity as an image of 
the Trinity (DT 15.23.44-15.24.44). One arrives at the ability to see God's 
nature reflected in one's own inner life through "the faith that purifies hearts" 
(DT 15.24.44), that is, through believing and reshaping one's life in accordance 
with that belief. Therefore, the proper method is first to "believe what the holy 
Books contain concerning the supreme Trinity that is God," then to "go on by 
prayer and enquiry and right living [orando et quaerendo et bene vivendo] to 
the pursuit of understanding-which means the seeing with the mind (as far as 
seeing is possible) of what is firmly held by faith" (DT 15.27.49). 
As in other areas of life, practice and inquiry must go together if we are to 
recognize the significance of our experience and broaden the possibilities for 
further experience. One might say that Christian life provides a training for the 
sensitivity to, and assessment of the significance of, aspects of experience, 
similar to the training provided by experience in medicine for recognizing and 
diagnosing symptoms. Ideally, reflective and prayerful Christian living would 
enable Christians to discern in their own knowledge and love a reflection of and 
indeed a participation in the divine Trinity. Likewise, one might hope to come 
through reflective Christian practice to learn to apply with confidence, as Augus-
tine does in the Confessions, such Christian terms as "sin" and "grace" to one's 
own experience. 
v 
So much for meaning, but what about truth? If I can learn to see myself as 
an image of a trinitarian God, is there a trinitarian God? Obviously, to go directly 
from the one to the other would not be a valid inference, but it certainly bolsters 
the reasonableness of my Christian commitment if I can, through believing what 
Christians believe and living accordingly, come to a better understanding simul-
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taneously of my own experience and of the language in which the Christian 
Church expresses its faith. 
I think this is the test of religious verification and falsification which Augustine 
offers: can this religion offer an intellectually coherent belief system integrated 
with a morally satisfactory way of life? Books 5 through 7 of the Confessions, 
read together with DMM, show how Manichaeism failed that test for Augustine. 
The Confessions lay great emphasis on Augustine's discovery that the cosmolog-
ical aspects of Manichaean doctrine were falsified by the findings of astronomers 
in regard to eclipses, but that, all by itself, could at least as reasonably have 
been an impulse to proceed to develop a more satisfactory Manichaean theology 
(or, maybe less reasonably, to develop an alternative astronomy, analogous to 
contemporary scientific creationism), as a catalyst for a loss of faith in Man-
ichaeism. The falsification of Manichaean cosmology is as decisive as it is for 
Augustine because Manichaeism was breaking down on other intellectual fronts 
at the same time, and Manichaean morality was increasingly seeming to him 
both impracticable and undesirable to the extent practiced. 21 On the other hand, 
as one can see from De moribus, the Confessions, De Trinitate, the letters and 
sermons, and many other works, Augustine, once becoming a Catholic Christian, 
never ceased to see the Church as the most promising context for the pursuit of 
understanding>4 and of proper human living, and found both quests satisfied there 
at least to some degree. It was therefore reasonable for him to respond to apparent 
anomalies in Christian faith not by becoming disaffected but by proceeding 
through reflective and prayerful Christian living (orando et quaerendo et bene 
vivendo) to try to resolve them. 
If practice has a central role in warranting the truth of established doctrines 
of the Church for an individual believer, it plays a similar part in warranting 
prospective doctrines for the Church as a whole. The most prominent example 
of this is the custom of infant baptism. In De baptismo (ca. A.D. 400), Augustine 
defends this practice as "the firm tradition of the universal Church," but is 
uncertain as to its effects on infants. Nonetheless, "no Christian will say they 
are baptized to no purpose. "25 Eventually this practice becomes the principal 
warrant for his doctrine of an inherited original sin. "Whosoever denies this, is 
convicted by the truth of the Church's very sacraments, which no heretical 
novelty in the Church of Christ is permitted to destroy or change, so long as the 
Divine Head rules and helps the entire body which He owns."26 Likewise he 
argues to the conclusion that perseverance in faith is a gift of grace from the 
fact that Christians pray for it. The practice of Christian asceticism is cited as 
evidence that concupiscence is wrong.27 In such cases, the Church's practice 
precedes and underlies the articulation in propositions, either as put forward by 
an individual in theology or as put forward by the Church collectively in a 
doctrinal statement, of what the Church believes. 
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VI 
I would like to conclude by returning to the present-day conversation to consider 
briefly a work which resembles Augustine's position in some of the aspects 
which I have been highlighting here, but which can be profitably supplemented 
by other aspects of Augustine's view. George Lindbeck, in The Nature of Doc-
trine, proposes a "cultural-linguistic" theory of religion, in which a religion is 
taken to be a framework of discourse and action, which shapes the entirety of 
its adherents' lives and thought. The truth of religious utterances "is only a 
function of their role in constituting a form of life, a way of being in the world, "28 
which conforms groups and individuals "in some measure in the various dimen-
sions of their existence to the ultimate reality and goodness that lies at the heart 
of things. "29 "Apologetics becomes primarily a matter of appropriate communal 
praxis."30 Theology becomes "intratextual," for instance "redescribing reality 
within the scriptural framework rather than translating Scripture into extra-scrip-
tural categories."" . 
Lindbeck's work shows the hazard of any effort to tie truth to social practice: 
as social practices are diverse, are we left with diverse, incommensurable 
frameworks of "truth" based on them, and thus with a relativism in which no 
truth claim can be grounded when addressed to those outside the community 
which makes the claim, or in which the claim is made? Lindbeck does not really 
want this result, but in some places he comes close to it. Thus he attacks the 
effort to make Christian faith credible within contemporary culture, and argues 
that theology "should instead prepare for a future when continuing dechristiani-
zation will make greater Christian authenticity possible."12 Tn that future, Christian 
discourse would be carried on in, and grounded in the praxis of, small counter-
cultural groups. " 
Augustine's approach escapes this sectarian trap. Communal praxis, including 
that of small, countercultural groups, plays an apologetic role for him, yet it is 
a role which he can use in rational argument directed to his Platonic- or Man-
ichaean-inclined audience. It is the kind of argument a social critic might use: 
here are some values and aspirations you and I share, here is how your present 
way of life falls short of realizing those ideals, here is how a Christian way of 
life would satisfy them. 
One of those aspirations is for a coherent understanding of all aspects of 
experience. Thus, Augustine can introduce its inconsistency with science as 
evidence for the inadequacy of Manichaeism, and can support the Christian 
doctrine of the Trinity by showing that on the basis of it we can come to a better 
understanding of our own subjectivity. Even though in the latter case he argues 
that a successful performance ultimately requires a religious and moral conver-
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sion, still he leads up to this point from a starting point common to Christians 
and non-Christians, namely the experience of knowledge and love. 
In these respects, as I have sought to demonstrate in this paper, there is in 
Augustine a basis for a view of the rationality of religious belief and commitment 
which grounds meaning and truth in practice, yet does not isolate religious 
meaning and truth, thus grounded, from the rest of human intellectual and 
practical life. 34 
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